Terrorism has been shown to inuence domestic politics, for example, by altering the priorities of voters and politicians. In this article I argue that terrorism has broader political consequences than simply putting national security on the political agenda. In particular, I argue that terrorist activity inuences government formation. A number of scholars have noted that the presence of an external threat provides an incentive to overcome internal disagreements, suggesting that larger and more inclusive coalitions should form. Terrorist activity may also inuence government survival as voters hold politicians accountable for failing to provide security. Politicians, in anticipation of terrorist activity, may, therefore, seek to form a more stable coalition. The literature on government survival suggests that the size of the coalition positively aects its durability but that its ideological breadth is expected to have an adverse eect on survival, which is the opposite of the prediction of the theory based on external threat. I analyze coalition formation in 17 parliamentary democracies over a 50 year period using data on domestic and transnational terrorism from, respectively, Engene (2007) and the Terrorism Knowledge Base. The results show that government coalitions are more likely to be surplus coalitions and, consistent with the theory emphasizing government survival, to have a low degree of ideological polarization in periods following terrorist activity.
terror attacks aimed at inuencing electoral outcomes has, for example, been entertained in numerous journalistic accounts. In August 2004, questions were raised concerning the Bush administration's decision to raise the terror alert level when it emerged that the decision was partly based on three or four year old information the implication was, of course, that the terror alert had been raised to shore up support for the president in the upcoming elections. 3 Whether or not there is any truth to the claim that the Bush administration abused the terror alert system, it raises an important point. If the public can be expected to react to terrorist incidents by punishing or rewarding political actors, we should expect political actors to respond to terrorist incidents in anticipation of (and in response to) the public's reaction. Such responses will not necessarily seek to take advantage of terror. They may, for example, aim at providing the government with greater legitimacy, which can potentially work both to prevent further terrorist incidents and to reduce the extent to which 1 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. TKB Incident Page: Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade attacked Transportation target (Mar. 11, 2004, Spain) . Website, accessed August 24, 2006. Available from: http: //www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=18518.
2 See, e.g., Chari (2004) , who concludes that the terrorist attack, in conjunction with the government's response, inuenced the outcome by increasing turnout, the vote choice of younger voters and strategic voters wanting to remove the People's Party from power.
3 CNN Bush team defends raising terror alert. Website, accessed 25 August, 2006. Available from http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/08/08/terror.threats/index.html. the government is held accountable for failing to prevent terrorism. In this manuscript I examine this thesis in the context of government formation in parliamentary democracies and consider whether terrorism inuences which types of coalitions form. Coalition formation may appear far removed from the world of terrorism and unlikely to be inuenced by it. However, the formation of a coalition can have direct implications for the government's legitimacy. Minority coalitions, by denition, represent only a minority of the population and may be more likely to be de-stabilized by terrorist activity. In times of terrorist activity, politicians may therefore rationally shy away from forming minority coalitions. The focus on the formation of governments is also justied by its importance. Policy-making in parliamentary democracies is more often than not dominated by the governing coalition if terrorism inuences which coalition forms one can infer that terrorism has important political consequences.
In the following section I place my research in the larger context of the literatures on international relations and terrorism. I then oer a brief discussion of the literature on coalition formation and discuss how terrorism inuences patterns of coalition formation.
Subsequently I describe the data, methods, and present the results of the statistical analysis.
The nal section oers concluding remarks.
International & Domestic Politics
There is little doubt that domestic and international politics interact in various ways. However, the literature has largely explored how the domestic political environment inuences international politics. 4 But international politics also inuence domestic politics in various ways. Trade agreements and foreign aid are, for example, topics that are often hotly debated in the domestic arena. Beyond considering how international politics provide issues that must be debated and settled within domestic institutions, there are few studies that consider how international politics inuence domestic politics. It, nevertheless, seems plausible that the international political environment has more systematic eects on domestic politics. For example, one would be hard pressed to explain the rise and fall of communist parties without reference to the international environment. The eects may also be more subtle, but no less important. I argue here that these eects may manifest themselves in a preference for government coalitions that have certain characteristics. In particular, I argue that terrorism results in the formation of larger and more ideologically cohesive coalitions.
Addressing a related question, Garnkel (2004) demonstrates formally that the threat of terrorism inuences political competition at the domestic level. To the extent that larger coalitions reect a lower degree of competition for political power, my results can be seen as speaking to Garnkel's ndings.
Studies of divided societies have emphasized the role of institutions in settling (domestic) conict. Lijphart (1968 Lijphart ( , 1977 suggested that power-sharing institutions could lead to a greater degree of accommodation and consensual politics. In Lijphart's view, power-sharing arrangements are conducive to mitigating conict in divided societies. 5 Yet, central to Lijphart's (1968, p. 213) account of consociationalist democracy is the presence of a political elite committed to overcome social cleavages and maintain stability. One of the factors Lijphart cites as important in providing the political elite with an incentive to build coalitions across cleavages is the presence of an external threat. Others have noted similar eects of external threats. Riker (1964) (Enders & Sandler 2006) . Domestic terrorism involves only actors of the country where the incident takes place. Both transnational and domestic terrorism is likely to breed a sense of insecurity among citizens and a demand for governmental response even if the capability of government to deal with the two types of terrorism may dier.
There are, however, reasons to believe that transnational and domestic terrorism may provoke dierent responses by voters. The 2004 election in Spain provides a telling example of how this may be. Spanish authorities initially blamed ETA, a Basque separatist organization, for the bombing of the Madrid train line. The attack was, however, uncharacteristic of ETA and experts soon pointed out that it resembled the methods of Al-Qaeda. The governing party, the People's Party, had backed the war in Iraq and was, therefore, expected to suer electorally if the attack was carried out by Al-Qaeda. On the other hand, the party could be expected to benet if ETA was responsible as the People's Party had taken a rm stance against ETA while the Socialists were seen to have been too cosy with the organization (Van Biezen 2005) . It is, therefore, not surprising that many voters suspected that the government had manipulated or withheld information or had used the attack for electoral purposes (Van Biezen 2005) . Thus, in this instance, the relevance of the terrorist attack was shown to depend clearly on the parties' previous policy choices and actions.
The literature on terrorism tends to be descriptive and qualitative but in recent years an increasing number of scholars have adopted quantitative approaches. Much of the literature focuses on explaining what determines terrorist activity. Enders & Sandler (2006) Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2006) and Brancati (2006) , for example, examine this idea. a cyclical component to terrorist activity but that there is little evidence to suggest that terrorism is increasing. Other studies have considered, e.g., the eects of counterterrorism (Enders & Sandler 1990 , Enders & Sandler 2000 , and political institutions (Eubank and expect political parties to go further than to simply adopt a new campaign rhetoric especially if voters hold governments accountable for failing to provide security. Building on Lijphart's (1968) insight, I ask whether the presence of external or internal terrorist threat calls for a more consensual government.
Coalition Formation & Terrorism
Theories of coalition formation can be divided into two categories; those that emphasize politicians' oce-motivations and those that focus on their policy-motivations. The former approaches predict the formation of minimal winning coalitions (rather than minority or surplus coalitions) while the latter forecast the formation of coalitions of ideologically similar parties. I focus my attention on coalition characteristics that have been shown to have a robust eect on the likelihood of the coalition forming and consider how terrorism may inuence those expectations. 6 Terrorism can have important electoral consequences for the governing coalition parties.
Providing for the security of its citizens is one of the primary roles of government and voters 6 Bandyopadhyay & Chatterjee (2006) provide a good overview of the literature on coalition formation. Martin & Stevenson (2001) oer a comprehensive test of the hypotheses oered in the literature. I exclude from my analysis some of the variables considered by Martin and Stevenson. In particular, I exclude variables such as formateur party, electoral pacts and anti-pacts because I consider these outcomes of the coalition bargaining process rather than determinants. That is, one would generally expect the same factors that inuence the formation of such pacts to inuence the formation of cabinet coalitions. Controlling for pacts (or formateur status) would, therefore, bias the estimates of the eect of the variables that are of primary importance, e.g., ideology and size. may hold the government accountable for failing at this basic task. There is a small but growing literature that suggests that terrorism inuences electoral outcomes. Comparing absentee ballots, cast before the Madrid bombing, with ballots cast on election day, Montalvo (2007) concludes that the terrorist attack had an substantial eect on the outcome of the election. Berrebi & Klor (2006) , using Israeli opinion poll data, nd that the number of deaths from terrorist attacks inuence voting behavior. Holmes & Piñeres (2002) 
attribute
Fujimori's public support to his success in dealing with terrorism. Jacobson (2003) and Langer & Cohen (2005) point out that voters in, respectively, the 2002 midterm election and the 2004 presidential election in the United States listed terrorism among the most important issues determining their vote choice. In an experimental study, Merolla & Zechmeister (2007) nd that voters weigh leadership characteristics more heavily in deciding how to cast their votes during security crises. 7
As Lupia & Strøm (1995) and Laver & Shepsle (1996) point out, public opinion shocks are likely to have destabilizing eects on coalition survival. 8 Insofar as concerns about coalition stability enter party leaders' calculations, they are likely to inuence which coalition forms.
That is, as coalition membership is generally seen as valuable, parties will seek to form coalitions that can be expected to last for a long time. Forming a stable coalition may be costly it means, for example, that the spoils of oce need to be shared with more parties.
The parties, thus, face a trade-o between a large share of the pie that they may only hold onto for a short period of time and a smaller share that they may enjoy for a longer period.
As the eects of terrorism become more relevant this trade-o will increasingly be resolved in favor of the latter option. Lijphart's (1968) theory of consociationalism can be taken to imply that terrorism inuences coalition formation. While it appears plausible that terrorism alerts parties to the importance of representing a unied front, the parties are unlikely to put all their disagreements aside. Instead parties will seek to form coalitions that are likely to withstand shocks in the form of terrorist activity while continuing to attain their other policy or oce related goals. The hypotheses are, thus, derived by considering how forward looking politicians respond to an environment in which the governing coalition is exposed to terrorism.
The literature on government survival oers useful guidance as it identies factors that inuence the duration of government coalitions. Two attributes of governing coalitions that have been shown to inuence government survival are of particular interest here. First, King, Alt, Laver & Burns (1990) , Diermeier & Stevenson (1999), and Warwick (1994) show that majority coalitions last longer than minority coalitions. However, they do not consider whether surplus coalitions dier from minimal winning majority coalitions. Surplus coalitions are possibly less stable than minimal winning coalitions because they can shed at least one party and still fend o a vote of no condence. I conjecture, however, that external threats make surplus coalitions more stable because they can claim greater legitimacy and signal unity in the face of adversity.
Second, Warwick (1992 Warwick ( , 1994 , Diermeier & Stevenson (1999) , and Jozwiak & Schneider (2006) nd that ideological heterogeneity within the cabinet reduces its lifespan. Thus, we should expect ideological divisions to be more important in the presence of terrorism.
Accordingly, external threats make ideologically polarized coalitions less likely to form. 9 I now briey review the main hypotheses from the literature on coalition formation and consider how the presence of terrorism interacts with the relevant coalition characteristics. 10 Each hypothesis describes both the expectation established by the coalition formation literature and how the presence of terrorism modies the standard expectation (i.e., whether I expect terrorism to reduce or magnify the eect).
The rst hypothesis holds that oce-seeking politicians will seek to form minimal winning coalitions (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944 , Gamson 1961 , Riker 1962 . Minimal winning coalitions allow the cabinet to fend o votes of no condence and to win support for its legislative programme. This further implies that minority coalitions should be less likely to form. Surplus coalitions are also unlikely because politicians want to maximize their share of the benets of oce, which implies that the coalition should not include any party that is not pivotal to the coalition's majority status. I have argued above that minority coalitions are less stable than majority coalitions, which in turn are less stable than surplus coalitions.
Thus, as terrorist activity increases and politicians seek to counter increased instability, I expect minority coalitions to become less likely and surplus coalitions more likely.
Hypothesis 1 While minority governments are less likely to form than majority governments the likelihood of a minority government forming decreases with greater levels of terrorist activity.
Hypothesis 2 While surplus governments are less likely to form than majority governments the likelihood of a surplus government forming increases with greater levels of terrorist 9 I note, however, that the parties' concern for legitimacy may imply the exact opposite hypothesis. If the parties aim to maximize the coalition's legitimacy the optimal strategy may be to include in the coalition an ideologically diverse set of parties. Similarly, Lijphart's conjecture suggests that more inclusive, and, hence, ideologically heterogenous, coalitions should form. My assumption, however, is that the parties' main concern is with the stability of the coalition. Although highly polarized coalitions may have some symbolic value, they represent a risky strategy. Since highly polarized coalitions are less stable to begin, they may encourage terrorist activity since it may not take much to tip the scale.
10 It may be helpful to note at the outset that the empirical analysis employs a conditional (xed-eects) logit model. In the conditional logit model each coalition formation opportunity consists of a number of potential coalitions that may form. Associated with each potential coalition are covariates, e.g., whether it is a minority coalition or it contains the median party. The conditional logit model estimates how the covariates inuence the likelihood of each potential coalition forming. Thus, the measure of terrorist activity cannot be entered directly into the model as it is constant across all the potential coalitions within each formation opportunity. Instead I am interested in considering whether terrorism inuences the estimates for a given covariate, e.g., whether being a minority coalition has bigger or smaller eect as terrorist activity varies.
activity.
The second set of hypotheses is derived from coalition theories that assume policymotivated politicians. Axelrod (1970) and de Swaan (1973) argued that ideologically homogenous coalitions should be more likely to form. Laver & Schoeld (1990) further pointed out, in the case of minority coalitions, that ideological divisions within the opposition should increase the likelihood of the coalition forming because the opposition parties will have a hard time settling their policy dierences. My argument, that government stability acquires greater importance in the presence of terrorist activity, in combination with the insights from the government survival literature has straightforward implication for these hypotheses. The ideological composition of the government coalition has been shown to inuence government survival (e.g., Warwick 1994) and the argument about why ideological composition of the opposition matters explicitly rests on the assumption that politicians care about their coalition's stability.
Hypothesis 3 Ideologically heterogeneous coalitions are less likely to form and become decreasingly likely at greater levels of terrorist activity.
Hypothesis 4 Minority coalitions facing an ideologically heterogeneous opposition are more likely to form and are increasingly likely at greater levels of terrorist activity.
Note that Hypotheses 3 and 4 oer an opportunity to distinguish between the simple formulation of Lijphart's (1968) consociationalist argument and the more nuanced view of parties seeking to nd a compromise between government stability and their other goals. Lijphart's (1968) logic would imply, in contrast with my hypotheses, that coalitions should become more ideologically heterogeneous in an eort to present a unied front.
The above four hypotheses are solidly grounded in the literatures on government formation and survival. Several other coalition characteristics have been shown to inuence coalition formation but, somewhat surprisingly, these characteristics are absent in the literature on government survival. 11 Although there is no evidence to suggest that these characteristics inuence government stability, I consider it worthwhile to hypothesize about their inuence on government stability and include them in my analysis for exploratory purposes.
The number of parties in a coalition has a negative impact on the likelihood of a coalition forming (Leiserson 1968 ). Leiserson's argument suggested that an agreement becomes more dicult to reach as the number of parties in the coalition increases. The ip-side of the coin is that larger coalitions should be less stable as the potential for inter-party conict 11 This may, of course, be due to a bias against publishing non-ndings in the discipline.
increases in the number of parties. Therefore, terrorist activity will increase the incentive, other things equal, to form a coalition composed of few parties. 12 Hypothesis 5 Coalitions composed of few parties are more likely to form and increasingly likely at greater levels of terrorist activity. Peleg (1981) and van Deemen (1989) argued that the largest party has an advantage in the coalition formation process. Coalitions that include the largest party will tend to be stronger and, consequently, more likely to form during times of terrorist threat. First, excluding the largest party may aect the government's legitimacy. Second, it is easier for larger parties to build coalitions it may be sucient for the largest party to convince one of the government parties to defect whereas smaller parties may have to win over more allies. 13 Hypothesis 6 Coalitions containing the largest party are more likely to form and are increasingly likely at greater levels of terrorist activity.
Finally, Laver & Schoeld (1990) argue that the median party in the legislature is likely to be included in the coalition. Any majority coalition that excludes the median party is necessarily (ideologically) disconnected, which implies that one of the coalition parties can be replaced by the median party to produce a more ideologically homogeneous coalition. In other words, coalitions that exclude the median party will tend to be less stable. Terrorist activity should, therefore, increase the likelihood of a government that includes the median party.
Hypothesis 7 Coalitions containing the median party are more likely to form and are increasingly likely at greater levels of terrorist activity. Because parties may be aected in dierent ways, one might expect domestic and transnational terrorism to have dierent eects. Unfortunately, formulating and testing specic hypotheses about how domestic and transnational terrorism diers in this regard requires far more detailed information about the political parties and their policies than is available. I can, however, oer a tentative hypothesis about the dierent eects of domestic and transnational terrorism. 12 The logic of the argument may appear to contradict the hypotheses about minority and surplus coalitions. Note, however, that the argument only implies that political parties would prefer a two party surplus coalition to a three party surplus coalition. On the other hand, the eect of the number of parties may be small if the coalition's legitimacy is a greater concern than its stability.
13 Admittedly, this argument cuts both ways because if the largest party is in government it can form a new coalition with relative ease, thus reducing government stability. Such government terminations are, however, not as clearly related to exogenous shocks.
Voters may be more likely to blame certain parties in the case of domestic terrorism, especially in the case of ethno-regional terrorist activity. Conicts based on ethno-regionalist interest often have a long history, which makes it more likely that the question of how to respond to such terrorist organization has entered the political dialogue and that parties have formulated dierent strategic responses. When that is the case, the scope for building more stable coalitions may be reduced and, thus, terrorism should have less inuence on coalition formation. Lijphart's (1968) focus on external threat might also be taken to imply that transnational terrorism has a greater impact especially as he was concerned with divided societies where the potential for domestic terrorist activity may be high. That is, domestic terrorism may, in some cases, be linked with the political divisions embedded in the party system, making cooperation more dicult.
On the other hand, there are reasons to belief that domestic terrorism should have a greater impact. Domestic terrorism is more frequent than the transnational variety and governments would apparently be better able to counter domestic actors, thus, empowering voters to hold government accountable. However, constant, long standing terrorist activity may reduce its relevance because it suggests that the government, whatever its composition, is simply unable to deal with the problem. Thus, because transnational terrorism is less frequent and, therefore, perhaps more unexpected, it may generate a greater response.
Below I examine whether domestic and transnational terrorism has dierent eects but I emphasize the preliminary nature of these results.
Empirical Test Methods
The hypotheses are tested using a conditional (xed-eects) logit model (McFadden 1974) .
Each time a coalition must be formed, following an election or after government dissolution, a number of potential coalitions may form. 14 Each potential coalition has certain characteristics it may, for example, be a minority, a majority, or a surplus coalition. The conditional logit model oers a convenient way of estimating how alternative specic characteristics (i.e., the characteristics of the potential coalitions) inuence the likelihood of the coalition forming. 15 14 For clarication, let us suppose there are three parties, {A, B, C}. The potential coalitions are all the possible subsets of {A, B, C} other than the empty set, i.e., {A, B, C}, {A, B}, {A, C}, {B, C} as well as the three potential single party coalition. Each of these coalitions contributes one observation to the data set.
15 Multinomial logit models cannot easily incorporate alternative specic characteristics that take continuous values (as, for example, government polarization does). Even if my attention were restricted to the choice between minority, minimal winning, and surplus coalitions, multinomial logit can lead to biased estimates as the frequency of, say, minority coalitions is not constant across choice sets. The probability of alternative j being chosen in government formation opportunity i is dened as:
where x is a vector of the covariates, β a vector of the coecients to be estimated and m i the number of alternative coalitions in government formation opportunity i.
The conditional logit model does not allow the estimation of choice specic eects, i.e., the circumstances surrounding a particular formation opportunity, in a simple manner it is easy to verify from (1) that covariates that do not vary within the choice set simply cancel out. Generally, the model can be tricked into considering choice specic eects by interacting the variable of interest with dummy variables for each of the choices. However, since potential coalitions cannot be compared in a meaningful way across countries, tricking the model in this manner makes little sense. 16 Terrorist activity is, therefore, interacted with the independent variables whose eect is hypothesized to be conditional on terrorist activity in line with the hypotheses presented above. terrorist activity. 17 The majority of the data on coalition formation and the composition of the legislature come from Müller & Strøm (2001) . The data in Müller & Strøm (2001) covers the Western European parliamentary system from the end of the Second World War until the late 1990s. Additional data was gathered to bring the dataset up to date. 18 In the full dataset there are a total of 293 coalition formation opportunities, i.e., instances in 16 As a practical matter, interpretation of the results would also be somewhat of a challenge as the number of choices is in the thousands in some cases. 17 The countries in my sample are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, (West) Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. New Zealand excluded from the analysis using data for domestic terrorism as data on domestic terrorism in New Zealand is not available. Following Martin & Stevenson (2001) , the analysis excludes single party majority situation. 18 In addition, the augmented dataset contains information on coalition formation in New Zealand since 1996. The data for Iceland is taken from Indridason (2005) . which a coalition was formed or renewed. Each coalition formation opportunity gives rise to a number of potential coalitions. 19 The set of potential coalitions represents all the possible permutations of party coalitions of which there are a total of 191,499 in the dataset. 20 The variables Minority Coalition, Surplus Coalition, and Largest Party are dichotomous variables indicating whether the potential coalition was a minority coalition, a minimal winning coalition, or contained the largest legislative party. The variable Number of Parties counts the number of parties in the potential coalition.
The independent variables measuring the ideological divisions within the potential government and the potential opposition were constructed using expert surveys on party po- were included in all the surveys. I then use the estimated coecients from the regression to predict the ideological positions of the parties that are missing in Benoit & Laver (2006) . 21 Another limitation of the data is that the expert surveys are fairly recent while my coalition formation data goes back to 1950. Implicitly this amounts to assuming that the parties' policy positions are fairly constant across time. This is obviously not true of some parties but it appears unlikely that this has a systematic eect on the government and opposition ideological polarization of the potential coalitions.
Several, usually minor, parties were excluded from these surveys. The ordering of these parties along the left-right spectrum in Müller & Strøm (2001) is used to estimate the parties' ideological position in a simple manner. I simply assume that the parties' position is the average of the ideological positions of the adjacent parties in the ordering given by Müller & Strøm (2001) . 22 These estimates are imperfect but they make use of the available information and there is little reason to believe that they contain a systematic bias. 19 If there are n parties there will be 2 n − 1 potential coalitions. 20 The data for transnational terrorism is only available from 1968. The number of coalition formation opportunities for the transnational terrorism analysis is 208 and a total of 179,184 potential coalitions. 21 An analogous method is used when only one measure of a party's ideological position exists. 22 If the two adjacent parties were not included in the surveys I assume that the parties are evenly spaced across the distance between the closest parties for which ideological estimates exist. If the parties are at the beginning or the end of the ordering I assume that their ideological position equals the most extreme party for which a survey exists.
The variable Median Party is an indicator variable that takes the value one when the potential coalition includes the median party. I measure the ideological heterogeneity of each potential coalition and its opposition using Esteban & Ray's (1994) measure of polarization (Government Polarization and Opposition Polarization). 23 The literature on coalition formation has normally used the ideological distance between the most extreme parties in the coalition (extreme position measure) to measure ideological divisions within coalitions.
There are three reasons why I opt for Esteban & Ray's (1994) polarization measure here.
First, Indridason (2006) shows that the extreme position measure does not satisfy any of Esteban & Ray's (1994) axioms. Yet the axioms describe changes in the distribution of policy preferences and group sizes that intuitively suggest a greater potential for conict. Second, Indridason (2006) also points out that the extreme position measure gives undue weight to small parties. Third, in the current context, it is appropriate to use a measure of ideological heterogeneity that gauges the potential for conict since the stability of coalitions forms an integral part of my theoretical account. Note that Opposition Polarization takes the value 0 when the potential coalition is a majority coalition since ideological heterogeneity is only hypothesized to have an eect when the potential coalition is a minority coalition. Esteban & Ray's (1994) polarization index equals: simply counts the number of terrorist incidents. Terrorist incidents can be coordinated, i.e., sometimes terrorist groups attack multiple targets at the same time. Each target is counted as a separate incident in the datasets but they can also be seen as a single attack.
It is plausible that separate terrorist incidents, perpetrated by dierent terrorist groups, will create a greater sense of insecurity than a coordinated attack (consisting of the same number of incidents) by a single group. 27 I therefore also construct a variable, No. Attacks, that counts the number of attacks. 28 Each measure is created for the one and two year period prior to the formation of each government coalition. Subscripts denote the length of the period, e.g., Fatalities 2 counts the number of fatalities in the two year period prior to the government formation. Table 1 details the frequency and severity of transnational and domestic terrorist incidents for each of the country in my sample. There is considerable variation in the number of terrorist incidents across countries. Finland and Iceland register only one (transnational) 27 Of course, the exact opposite could be true. A terrorist group capable of carrying out a coordinated attack may well be seen as a greater threat to security. My point remains; we can not assume that coordinated incidents have the same eect. 28 The TKB data identies coordinated attacks. In the TWEED data coordinated attacks were identifying by assuming that attacks that take place on the same data, in the same country, and by the same terrorist group were coordinated. 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 continues to rise throughout the eighties. The trend since then has been that of a decline in the number of incidents. Transnational terrorism is also clearly associated with the most deadly terrorist incidents, e.g., the Lockerbie and Madrid bombings. Interestingly, if those exceptional cases are excluded, transnational terrorism appears to be less deadly than domestic terrorism, i.e., the ratio of the number fatalities to the number of terrorist incidents is much lower for transnational terrorism. Table 2 presents the results for the eect of transnational terrorism on coalition formation.
Results
Each column represents a dierent measure of terrorist activity as indicated at the top of the table. The measures of terrorism enter the model as interaction with coalition characteristics and are denoted by "T*" the relevant coalition characteristic, e.g., T*Minority Coalition is the interaction of the variable identied in the column heading and the variable Minority Coalition.
The rst thing to note about the results is that the coalition characteristics identied as important by the coalition literature are highly signicant with exception of Opposition Polarization. Our main interest, however, is how terrorist activity modies the eects of the coalition characteristics. I begin by considering my primary hypotheses, i.e., the 29 It bears noting that the United Kingdom only contributes a single coalition formation opportunity (in 1974) to my analysis as normally a single party wins an outright majority and forms a single party government.
interactions of terrorist activity with the coalition characteristics that have been shown to inuence government stability. Starting with Minority Coalition, terrorism only has a statistically signicant eect on the likelihood of a minority coalition forming when terrorism is measured as a number of fatalities although the estimated eect is consistently in the expected direction. The eect of terrorism on the likelihood of a surplus coalition forming nds greater support in the data. The coecients for the number of terrorist incidents and attacks are all statistically signicant at the 95% level and the coecients for fatalities are signicant at the 90% level. In sum, Hypothesis 1 is at best weakly supported while there is considerable support for Hypothesis 2. This is not surprising since the incentive to form surplus coalitions (or majority coalitions instead of minority) will generally serve to increase the number of parties in the coalition.
The interaction with the inclusion of the largest party in the coalition has a statistically signicant when Fatalities are considered but doesn't reach statistical signicance otherwise. There is no evidence to suggest that terrorism inuences the inclusion of the median party in the coalition. Table 3 displays the results for the eects of domestic terrorism on coalition formation.
On the whole, domestic terrorism has less eect on coalition formation than does transnational terrorism. Terrorism has no perceptible eect on the formation of minority coalitions.
The estimated eect of domestic terrorism on the formation of surplus coalitions is always in line with my expectations but it is only statistically signicant when terrorist activity is measured by the number of injured.
As in the case of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism does inuence how polarized the forming coalition is although the eect is not as pronounced as before. Opposition Polarization, as before, does not appear to be inuenced by terrorism. Domestic terror activity is estimated to make coalitions containing many parties less likely to form but this eect is only signicant in one instance and then only at the 90% level. The eects of the remaining variables, Median Party and Largest Party, are not inuenced by domestic terrorism. Tables 2 and 3 suggests that transnational terrorism has greater impact on coalition formation than domestic terrorism. 30 In both cases terrorism is shown to increase the likelihood of a surplus coalition forming and decrease the likelihood of a highly polarized coalition forming. In the case of transnational terrorism the data also weakly indicate that minority coalitions are less likely to form. As I hypothesized above, these dierences may result from the fact that the political parties may have developed dierent policies on how to deal with domestic terrorist activity. In contrast, transnational terrorism is more likely to call for a uniform response by the parties although, in some cases, parties may be perceived as diering in their capability to ght terrorism or being responsible for provoking the attacks. However, the evidence on this point is not very strong and I hope to examine it greater detail in future research.
Focusing on government stability has allowed us to deduce seemingly contradictory hypotheses, i.e., that politicians will be more likely to form i) surplus coalitions and ii) ideologically homogenous coalitions when faced with terrorist activity. However, the hypotheses are not contradictory because, rst, each hypotheses may represent a strategy for dealing with instability (i.e., they are substitutes), and, second, it is possible to form less ideologically polarized surplus coalitions (i.e., if they replace ideologically disconnected coalitions).
More importantly, these hypotheses allow for an interesting comparison with Lijphart's (1968) conjecture about external threats and consociational politics. While Lijphart's conjecture is in agreement with my coalition stability hypothesis with regard to the formation of surplus coalitions, Lijphart's conjecture implies quite a dierent hypothesis about the ideological composition of the coalition. If external threats lead to more consociational forms of government, coalition governments should be more heterogeneous ideologically, and not less, as the empirical results indicate. This suggests that external threats, at least in this context, do not promote more consensual politics. 31 Instead, the results are more consistent with the view that, in the presence of exogenous shocks, politicians have an incentive to form coalition that are more stable and likely to keep them at the reins for longer periods of time.
Conclusions
In his work on consociationalism Lijphart (1968) conjectured that external threats were one of the factors that provided the political elite with an incentive to maintain cooperation across societal cleavages. In this manuscript I have explored a variant of his argument, 30 Note that the data on transnational terrorism is only available from 1968, as opposed to 1950 for domestic terrorism, which should make it harder to detect a relationship in the analysis of the transnational terrorism.
31 Lijphart (1968) , of course, did not have address terrorism specically so we should be careful in interpret the nding as contradicting his conjecture.
arguing that terrorism constitutes such external threat or, alternatively, that terrorism instills the political elite with incentives to form more stable coalitions. The literature on government survival has identied several factors that enhance government stability and I have focused on these factors to derive hypotheses about how terrorism might inuence the formation of government coalitions. In addition I consider several other factors that have been shown to inuence the formation of coalitions but not their stability.
The ndings indicate that terrorist activity inuences two of the factors that are closely linked with the stability of government coalitions. Coalitions formed in periods of substantial terrorist activity are more likely to be surplus coalitions and less likely to be highly polarized.
These ndings are consistent across the dierent measures of terrorism I consider and hold, largely, for both domestic and transnational terrorist incidents. I also nd some indications that minority coalitions are less likely to form where terrorist incidents have taken place but the eect is weak and can only be said to be present for transnational terrorist incidents.
The results suggest that transnational terrorism has a greater impact on coalition formation than domestic terrorism. We, however, wish to caution against reading too much into these results. First, the dierences are relatively minor second. Second, my argument emphasized that voters were more likely to see some parties as being more accountable for domestic terrorism than others. At present, our data doesn't provide sucient information to properly test this conjecture.
The eect of the variables that inuence coalition formation but have not been shown to inuence the stability of government, is not conditional on terrorist activity. This suggests that my causal argument, i.e., that terrorism inuence coalition formation via its destabilizing eects on coalitions, has some merit.
While the literature on terrorism has grown substantially, and become more quantitative, in recent years, I am not aware of any studies that consider the broader political implications of terrorism, e.g., whether the presence of terrorism leads to more consensual domestic politics or how it inuence political competition. This study is a rst step in this direction and the results suggest that the subject deserves greater scrutiny. In the future I hope to consider how terrorism may inuence other aspects of domestic politics. In line with my main argument, considering the eects of terrorism on government duration is of particular interest. Further disaggregation of terrorist activity is also an avenue I hope to pursue.
Here I have merely distinguished between domestic and transnational terrorism but one can equally well imagine that, for example, types of targets and motives of terrorist groups have dierent eects.
